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11.1  Introduction 
Until 1980, Turkish economic policies were broadly typical of those of most 
developing  countries. A policy  of import substitution had been consistently 
followed at least since the 1950s, with prohibition of imports of commodities 
for which domestic production was deemed adequate. In part to foster import 
substitution,  but  more  importantly  because  foreign  exchange  was  always 
scarce, those policies were buttressed by quantitative restrictions on imports 
and tight exchange control, which increased the inner orientation of the econ- 
omy even beyond that which would have resulted from those policies under- 
taken to encourage import substitution. State economic enterprises (SEES)  had 
been established and expanded to process and market agricultural commodi- 
ties, to extract and export minerals, and to produce a wide variety of manufac- 
tured goods. Negative real interest rates enabled the government to direct re- 
sources  through  allocation  of  rationed  credit,  as  well  as  through  import 
licensing. 
In the course of economic growth in the postwar period, the Turkish authori- 
ties had  already twice been confronted with mounting balance of  payments 
difficulties and rising inflation. In both instances, there had been fairly typical 
stabilization programs,  which succeeded in improving the foreign exchange 
situation and, in the earlier crisis in 1958, drastically reducing inflation. 
By the late 1970s, Turkey was confronting yet another crisis. Inflation had 
accelerated throughout the 1970s, and reached an annual rate of over 100%  by 
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late 1979 in a country with relatively few indexation mechanisms and strong 
sensitivity to it on the part of influential groups (including the civil service and 
the military). 
While the political reaction to inflation would probably in itself have forced 
policy changes, foreign exchange shortages at an increasingly overvalued ex- 
change rate were also resulting in major difficulties  and dislocations. Some 
economists even estimated that there were negative gross foreign exchange 
reserves by late 1979! Whether true or not, there were certainly long delays in 
obtaining import licenses and foreign exchange, embassy employees overseas 
went months without being paid, there was no coffee, and the short supplies 
of petroleum and other imports resulted in severe dislocations and hardships 
during the  severe Anatolian  winter. According  to the  official  statistics, real 
GNP fell only 5% over the  1977-79  period, but contemporary accounts and 
observations of  those who lived through  it suggest a far steeper drop, espe- 
cially starting in the second half of  1979. 
Throughout the latter part of  the  1970s, successive coalition governments 
had  attempted unsuccessfully to grapple with economic difficulties.  Several 
IMF-supported  programs  had  been  started,  only  to  be abandoned  when  it 
proved infeasible to implement them. Governments had changed frequently, in 
large part in response to dissatisfaction with economic performance.  By the 
beginning of the  1980s, it seemed  clear that Turkey  was in for yet another 
round of stabilization following the pattern of 1958 and 1970. 
Instead, when policy  changes came in early  1980, they were far different 
both  in  announcement  and in  action  from the two earlier episodes.  Instead 
of  addressing primarily  the  macroeconomic  issues driving inflation  and the 
immediate balance-of-payments difficulties, the authorities announced a pro- 
gram that had two fundamental objectives: to alter underlying economic poli- 
cies aimed toward growth and to reduce the rate of inflation. While this second 
objective had been included in both earlier programs (although the Turks were 
singularly unsuccessful in achieving it in the second), the enunciation and pur- 
suit of the first objective constituted a major departure from past economic pol- 
icies. 
From its initiation, the sectoral reform program was articulated and designed 
to  shift  Turkey’s entire  growth  strategy  away  from  import  substitution  and 
toward greater integration with the international market. Moreover, it was ex- 
plicitly stated that the role of the government in the economy was to be greatly 
diminished and that private enterprise would be relied upon to generate eco- 
nomic growth. From a historical perspective, this was revolutionary  indeed! 
For purposes of this analysis, I shall refer to the entire set of policies designed 
to achieve this result as being “sectoral” reforms, contrasted with the policies 
entailed in stabilization that will be termed “macro” reforms.’ 
1. There is, however, at least one important and visible link between macro and sectoral reforms, 
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After  1980, policy reforms continued. Although macro reforms were ini- 
tially successful, with the rate of inflation falling from over 100% to a low of 
about 35% in  1982, the rate of  inflation  thereafter rose again, and inflation 
continued as a problem throughout the 1980s. By contrast, the sectoral reforms 
geared to shifting reliance toward the private sector and integrating the Turkish 
economy with that of the rest of the world gathered momentum as the decade 
proceeded.  By the early  1990s, it could fairly be said that Turkey’s sectoral 
reforms had  been-at  least to  1991-successful,  while  Turkey’s macro re- 
forms had largely failed. Important questions focused on the sustainability of 
the sectoral reforms in light of continuing inflation and macroeconomic diffi- 
culties. 
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the Turkish reforms of the  1980s 
and their relationship to growth. A natural starting point is a brief review of 
the earlier stabilization programs, the topic of section 11.2. Section  I I .3 then 
covers the economic difficulties and policies immediately preceding the Janu- 
ary 1980 reforms. Section 11.4 reviews the initial reform program and the re- 
sponse to it. Section  11.5 covers the second phase of reforms, starting in the 
fall of 1983. Section 11.6 analyzes the real growth of the economy starting in 
1983, while section  11.7 covers the macro reforms and their consequences. 
Section 11.8 addresses the reasons why the macro reforms were so unsuccess- 
ful while  the  sectoral  reforms  appear  to  have  delivered  such  satisfactory 
growth. Section 11.9 concludes by providing a tentative assessment of the sus- 
tainability  of  the  altered policies toward  the  various  sectors of the Turkish 
economy in light of the overall macroeconomic difficulties. 
11.2  Two Preceding Cycles 
Turkey became an independent state after the First World War, as the Otto- 
man Empire disintegrated. With Ataturk as a national charismatic leader, eco- 
nomic policy for raising living standards was already an important national 
issue in the  1920s and  1930s. After a brief effort to develop through laissez- 
faire in the 1920s, Ataturk switched to etatism2 as a philosophy in the  193Os, 
and the first large SEEs were founded, producing textiles, footwear, and a vari- 
ety of other manufactured goods. 
Ataturk died in 1938 but remained the revered founding father of the nation. 
In the post war period, economic growth resumed, with SEEs expanding rap- 
Those deficits alone exceeded 5% of GNP by  the late 1970s. Reforms restructuring the SEEs in 
ways that prevented the expansion of Central Bank credit were both sectoral insofar as they in- 
creased the efficiency of SEEs (or reduced the resources allocated to inefficient activities) and 
macro insofar as they reduced inflationary pressures. 
2. See Okyar (1965) for an analysis. For present purposes, it suffices to say that etatism was 
articulated as a rationale for state economic activities through SEEs. These activities were sup- 
posed to coexist, however, with private economic activity. Etatism clearly grew out of the distrust 
of markets that was worldwide in the 1930s. 346  Anne 0.  Krueger 
idly into new import substitution activities. The underlying policy of etatism 
remained the guiding principle of development efforts until  1980. Starting in 
the late 1940s, Turkey’s economy grew rapidly, as the opportunities afforded 
by postwar recovery, receipt of Point IV and Marshall Plan aid, and a buoyant 
world economy all conduced to economic growth. Simultaneously, there was 
a rapid increase in government expenditures, especially on investment projects 
designed to accelerate economic growth. 
Starting in  1953, however, export growth ceased,’ both because of the end 
of the Korean War commodity boom and because of the shift of resources to 
the buoyant domestic market. Simultaneously the rate of inflation accelerated. 
As in many other countries at that time, the Turkish authorities were committed 
to maintaining a fixed nominal exchange rate. By 1954, the government intro- 
duced import licensing in an effort to restrain the demand for imports in line 
with the availability  of foreign exchange. Over the next several years, infla- 
tionary pressures intensified4 while foreign exchange earnings continued to 
drop. 
By  1957, the situation was by  any measure  serious. Surcharges had been 
imposed on imports; even those who received import licenses waited eight to 
twelve months for foreign exchange permits. Export earnings were dropping 
rapidly, and the black market premium was more than 100%  above the nominal 
exchange rate. At that time, as in many other countries, the top political leader- 
ship (Adnan Menderes) was adamantly opposed to any change in the nominal 
exchange rate. By then, Turks were financing imports with suppliers’ credits 
and other short-term, high-interest-bearing  notes. As the harvest approached 
in  1958, however, even that source of  financing was disappearing, and it be- 
came evident that little if any gasoline would be available to enable the trucks 
to move the harvest to ports, without a change in policies. 
Reluctantly, the government of Turkey agreed with the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF) to a stabilization program, the key elements of which were 
a major devaluation (from TL2.8 to TL9 per US.  dollar); immediate import 
liberalization  and  rationalization  of  import licensing  schemes;5 ceilings  on 
3. Turkey had expanded the area under cultivation for wheat through introduction of tractors 
and mechanization in the late 1940s and was even the world’s largest wheat exporter in the early 
1950s. The evidence suggests that this large effort was in fact uneconomic in the long run, and 
wheat exports peaked in 1953. See Krueger (1974) for a discussion. 
4. It is difficult to provide a good estimate of the rate of inflation. The Turkish authorities im- 
posed price controls on most basic consumer goods in an effort to restrain inflation, and it was the 
official prices of  those goods that entered  into the  official price statistics. According to those 
statistics, the rate of inflation reached an annual rate of almost 25% by  1958, having exceeded 
10% annually since 1954. 
5. Until  1958, import licenses had been dealt with on an ad hoc basis. The 1958 program in- 
cluded provisions so that there would be  some imports (on a “liberalized list”) for which the 
granting of foreign exchange was more or less automatic, some imports (the “quota list”) for which 
quantitative limits were set and whose allocation was subject to detailed bureaucratic negotiation, 
and some imports whose origin could only be Turkey’s bilateral trading partners. Any commodity 
not listed was ineligible for importation. This basic system lasted until the early 1980%  with new 
lists published every six months. See Krueger (1974, chap. 6) for a detailed description of how 
the system worked. 347  Partial Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s in Turkey 
government expenditures, credit, and the money  supply; and an  increase in 
prices of  commodities produced by  SEEs, with the removal of price controls 
over most items for the private economy.6 Import liberalization was financed 
by  IMF and other official credits; official creditors also sponsored and sup- 
ported debt rescheduling for Turkey’s outstanding debt.7 
Most  of  the  components of  this  package  are  fairly  standard  in  IMF- 
supported programs, and require little comment. A possible exception is the 
increases in prices of SEEs, which featured prominently in the 1970 and 1980 
reforms as well. As already mentioned, efforts to control inflation in the years 
prior to 1958 consisted largely of the imposition of price controls. Private sec- 
tor firms responded either by  shutting down or by selling in the black market. 
SEEs, however, sold at official prices and incurred losses. As inflation acceler- 
ated, these losses mounted. The losses, in turn, were covered by credits auto- 
matically extended by the Central Bank to the various loss-making SEEs. The 
result was growth in the money supply fueled in significant measure by  SEE 
deficits. Raising the prices of  goods produced by  SEEs in 1958 naturally re- 
sulted in an immediate once-and-for-all increase in the various price indices; 
after that, however, the reduced rate of expansion of Central Bank credits re- 
sulted in a reduced rate of  inflation. Indeed, the  1958 Turkish stabilization 
program was unusual in that real GDP, which had been declining, started grow- 
ing immediately in response to greater availability of  imports, while the rate 
of inflation dropped dramatically: from 25% (at the understated official meas- 
ure) in 1958 to less than 5% in 1959. 
After the initial stabilization plan in the summer of  1958, export earnings 
rose, other foreign exchange receipts increased, and the flow of  imports re- 
turned to more normal levels relative to the level of  economic activity. Al- 
though there was a temporary setback in  1959 as the expenditure and other 
ceilings negotiated with the IMF were violated, a military coup in May  1960 
was accompanied by a recommitment to the major provisions of the stabiliza- 
tion program. The rate of  growth of  real GDP accelerated, and Turkey was 
among the more rapidly growing developing countries for most of the 1960s. 
However, Turkey’s  annual inflation rate in  the  1960s was in  the 5-10% 
range, and the nominal exchange rate was held constant after the 1958 devalua- 
tion. Public and private investment expenditures had increased rapidly in the 
early 1960s, financed largely by  foreign aid. When, in the later part of  the 
1960s, foreign aid did not increase, the government nonetheless attempted to 
maintain the rate of investment. The increased demand for imports, therefore, 
resulted in lengthening queues at the Central Bank. Delays in obtaining im- 
ports needed for spare parts and intermediate goods of  a year  to eighteen 
months were common. The resulting excess capacity in newly established im- 
6. For an analysis of the program, see Sturc (1968). 
7. In order to ascertain the level of indebtedness, the Turkish authorities had to advertise in 
western European and other newspapers and magazines, asking creditors to notify them as to the 
amount they were owed: there was no systematic record of debt in Turkey, a situation that did not 
change until the 1980s. See Krueger (1974, chap. 2) for an account. 348  Anne 0.  Krueger 
port substitution industries, combined with the slowdown in investment proj- 
ects resulting from delays in obtaining imports, was a visible restraint on eco- 
nomic activity and growth. 
Although inflation was accelerating, the chief impetus to the 1970 devalua- 
tion was clearly the foreign exchange situation. Although circumstances were 
by  no means as extreme  as they  had been  in  1958, the import substitution 
activities that had been carried out during the 1960s had left the economy more 
dependent on imports of  intermediate  goods and raw  materials  to continue 
factory operations than had earlier been the case; inflation was not widely per- 
ceived to be a major problem. 
The 1970 devaluation had many of the same components as the earlier one, 
although  emphasis was much more on  the foreign trade regime and the ex- 
change rate than in  1958. The nominal exchange rate was adjusted from TL9 
per U.S. dollar to TL15; the government again received extensive foreign cred- 
its, and imports were liberalized, although the “lists” (see note 5) continued to 
be used in much the same manner as when they were started in 1958. 
In contrast to the 1958 devaluation, however, the economy’s response to the 
1970 devaluation  was  much  more rapid.  In  particular, export  earnings rose 
sharply, and, at the same time, Turkish workers in Germany and other western 
European countries remitted sizable amounts of foreign exchange. There was 
no mechanism readily at hand for the Central Bank to sterilize these inflows, 
and as a consequence workers’ remittances expanded the Turkish money sup- 
ply  sharply.  Inflation  therefore  accelerated,  although foreign  exchange  was 
plentiful. During the first half  of the  1970s, however, real economic growth 
was rapid, spurred in part by expansionary  monetary and fiscal policies, and 
in part by  the increases in  investment that the comfortable foreign exchange 
position permitted. 
As of  1975, Turks regarded  their real growth rate of around 7% annually 
almost as an immutable constant: Turkey had been growing rapidly and per 
capita incomes had been rising steadily since the early  1950s despite popula- 
tion growth well in excess of 2.5% annually. 
11.3  Run-up to the Third Crisis 
Inflation had already reached an annual rate of  25% by  1973 when the first 
increase in the world price of oil was effected. Although the nominal exchange 
rate had been held constant since 1970, foreign exchange receipts from exports 
and from workers’ remittances continued rising sharply, so that there was no 
immediate foreign exchange problem. Indeed, the Turkish authorities were in 
the unaccustomed situation of accumulating foreign exchange reserves in 197  1 
and 1972. 
The result was that, when the terms of trade deteriorated sharply because of 
oil, the authorities failed initially to alter the internal prices of petroleum and 
its products, letting the SEE handling petroleum  instead incur losses and  fi- 349  Partial Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s in Turkey 
nancing the increased cost of imports out of foreign exchange reserves. Fiscal 
deficits therefore increased in  1974 and 1975, as the overvaluation of the ex- 
change rate associated  with accelerating inflation increased,  while the fiscal 
deficit itself and the failure to change the internal price of oil and its derivatives 
made the situation worse.* 
Table 11.1 gives data on the economic deterioration between 1975 and 1980. 
Annual data understate the extent of the difficulties as they mounted late in 
1979 and early  1980, as imports increased  sharply in  1980 after the January 
policy changes and the rapid downward spiral in real GDP was reversed. Even 
by these annual figures, however, it is evident that real GDP grew only  15% 
between  1975 and  1980, while  population  increased  by  almost  the  same 
amount. For a country accustomed to rapid growth in per capita incomes, the 
slowdown was abrupt. Moreover, acceleration of inflation resulted in economic 
discomfort for the many influential groups-military,  civil servants, academ- 
ics, pensioners-whose  incomes were fixed without indexatiomY  In  1976 and 
1977, as can be seen in table 11.1, imports continued to grow, albeit slowly. 
By 1978, however, sources of financing were disappearing, and imports were 
reduced with consequent dislocations of economic activity.  lo 
Several aspects of  economic policy  had  gone badly  wrong in  the early 
1970s. All  measures  of  the price  level reflected  sharp increases.  By  1975, 
prices are estimated to have been 134%  above their 1970 level, yet the nominal 
exchange rate was still TL 15.15 in 1975-virtually  the same as it had been in 
1970. Although the nominal exchange rate was altered more frequently after 
1975 as inflation accelerated, the GDP deflator increased 258% from 1975 to 
1979, while the official price of  foreign exchange was increased  165%. The 
real exchange rate, therefore, had appreciated massively in a situation in which, 
given the deterioration in Turkey's terms of trade, it should have depreciated." 
SEE deficits were large and increasing in the late 1970s. By 1979, transfers 
to SEES to cover their deficits accounted  for  13.6% of  general  government 
expenditures,  and the fiscal deficit was equal to more than 4%  of GDP (and 
16% of government revenues). Meanwhile,  nominal  interest rates were kept 
8. Dervis, De Melo, and Robinson (1982, 346) estimated the separate contributions of  each 
factor to the buildup of the crisis. As of  1977, they estimated that the economic costs of the crisis 
were equal to about 9.7% of GDP. of which 1.1% was the result of the negative swing in Turkey's 
terms of trade (primarily but not entirely oil), 5.1% was attributable to reduced foreign resources, 
0.98 was due to increased trade distortions, and 2.6% was attributable to the reduction in domestic 
production necessitated by reduced imports. 
9. Despite periodic  adjustments,  real  incomes  of  persons  in  these  groups  fell,  as nominal 
changes were systematically less than the preceding change in the price level, while inflation was 
accelerating. 
10. To be sure, there was considerable smuggling during this period, so that the official statistics 
may overstate the reduction in imports. Nonetheless, supplies of commodities that are difficult to 
smuggle, such as oil, were dropping, resulting in severe dislocation. 
11. As imperfect as it is, the percentage by  which the black market exchange rate exceeds the 
official rate gives some idea of the extent of  distortion in the nominal exchange rate. In 1975, the 
black market premium is estimated to have been about 10%;  by  1978 it was 5 1.6%; and by early 
1979 it reached a level 91.4% above the official exchange rate. See Krueger and Aktan (1992,27). 350  Anne 0.  Krueger 
Table 11.1  Indicators of Turkish Economic Deterioration, 1975-80 
1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
RealGDPpercapita(1975 = 100)  100  109  113  118  116  115 
Wholesale prices (1975 = 100)  100  116  142  213  353  761 
Current account deficit (millions 
of US$)  1,648  2,029  3,140  1,265  1,413  3,408 
Imports (millions of  US$)  4,502  4,872  5,506  4,369  4,815  7,513 
Total debt (billions of US$)  3.6  4.3  11.4  14.8  15.9  19.0 
~  ~~  ~~ 
Source: Krueger and Aktan (1992), appendix tables for the first four rows; table 6, p. 28, for debt. 
low (in part to facilitate financing public debt). The real interest rate, calculated 
as the difference between  the inflation rate and the general  nominal interest 
rate for medium-term credits, was minus 38.5% in April  1978, minus 51.3% 
in May 1979, and reached minus 100.5% in March 1980. 
One other phenomenon of the late 1970s deserves mention. It has already 
been pointed out that there were weak coalition governments during that pe- 
riod. In part, those weak coalitions reflected underlying divisions within soci- 
ety and societal unrest. This was reflected, inter aha, in the radicalization of 
labor unions and of student groups, with attendant violence and civil unrest.’* 
It is estimated that 8 million man-days were lost to strikes in 1980, compared 
to 1 million for all of 1979 (Baysan and Blitzer 199  I, 359). The impact on the 
economy of the unions was substantial. On one hand, they demanded, and most 
got, large wage increases. On the other, once wage increases were granted, 
unions were frequently reorganized under new leadership and went on strike 
once again to demand even more. By the late summer of  1979, real wages of 
factory workers had increased rapidly over the preceding decade, even during 
the period  when  real  output was declining. From  the viewpoint of Turkish 
industry, however, the strikes and work stoppages were highly disruptive and 
were at least as damaging as the delays and shortages of imports. 
Thus, by any standard, the Turkish economy was in severe disequilibrium 
by 1980. Inflation had reached triple digits and was still accelerating; imports 
were more and more constrained, and the premiums on import licenses and on 
black market foreign exchange were high and rising rapidly; and real output 
and incomes were falling. The reasons for this are clear in the policy indica- 
tors: a highly overvalued  and unrealistic nominal exchange rate and interest 
rate; a large and growing fiscal deficit and rapid expansion of the money sup- 
ply; and severe restrictions on foreign trade and domestic investment (because 
of foreign exchange difficulties). 
In  1978 and  1979, two  stabilization  programs  were  negotiated  with  the 
IMF.” Both of these were abandoned when the agreed-upon policies were not 
12. See Krueger and Turan (1993) for an account. 
13. For an excellent account, see Okyar (1983). 351  Partial Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s in Turkey 
enacted, as the coalition governments were simply unable to restrain govern- 
ment expenditures, reduce SEE deficits, or raise taxes. 
When  Suleyman Demirel became prime minister of  yet another coalition 
government in the fall of  1979, therefore, he inherited an extremely difficult 
economic situation. He had no more parliamentary support than had the prede- 
cessor governments under Bulent Ecevit, but the fact that economic deteriora- 
tion had been so prolonged perhaps gave him some room for maneuvering. In 
a sense, the usual political coalitions that had prevented  action  earlier were 
rendered ineffective by the severity of the crisis. 
11.4  The 1980 Reform Program and Initial Response 
By late  1979, there was universal  agreement that the economy  was once 
again in  crisis. Unlike the earlier episodes, however, there  were significant 
groups (including most prominently the association of Turkish industrialists) 
that had concluded that the earlier policies of import substitution had failed 
and would not generate future growth, even if the crisis was overcome. There 
was active  advocacy  of  an  alternative  strategy  by  the Turkish  industrialists 
and  other^.'^ 
When Suleyman Demirel became prime minister, he appointed Turgut Ozal 
to be deputy prime minister in charge of  economic policy. Ozal and a very 
small team of bureaucrats (estimated to have been less than ten persons alto- 
gether) then drew up a program for reform, which was announced by the prime 
minister late in January  1980. Even key ministers had been  unaware of  the 
scope of the plan outside their own domain; they were asked to sign a variety 
of  decrees on a piecemeal basis and had no advance information as to what 
other components of the program would be. 
There were several key initial measures: (1) devaluation of the Turkish lira 
from 35 to 70 per U.S. dollar, with an announcement that henceforth the Turk- 
ish lira exchange rate would be changed frequently to reflect the differential 
between domestic and foreign inflation;lS (2) increases in the prices of almost 
all goods produced by SEEs, with an announcement that SEEs would in future 
be free to set their own prices and would not be permitted to borrow from the 
Central Bank; and (3) a variety of changes in the organization of the various 
ministries and bureaus that were responsible for economic policy, with the gen- 
eral purpose of reducing the power of some traditional groups and strengthen- 
ing the hand of the deputy prime minister. 
Thereafter, a number of other economic problems were addressed, and addi- 
tional policy changes were announced at frequent intervals. Turkish debt was 
rescheduled under the auspices of the London and Paris Clubs, with financial 
14. See Krueger and Turan (1993) for an extended discussion. 
15. In fact, the Turkish lira was depreciated  somewhat more rapidly than the differential in 
inflation between Turkey and her trading partners; see table  I I .2. 352  Anne 0.  Krueger 
support from the European Communities  as well as the multilateral  institu- 
tions. After the January  devaluation, the nominal  exchange rate was altered 
frequently, until daily changes became routine starting in mid-1981. In June 
1980, ceilings on bank deposit rates were lifted. Throughout the year, condi- 
tions under which Turks could hold and use foreign exchange were liberalized, 
as banks and exporters were authorized to retain sizable fractions of their re- 
ceipts. Trade in gold had been legalized in January. 
It should be noted that the initial January 1980 program was announced and 
implemented with no IMF program. Although there had been contact between 
Ozal’s team and IMF staff prior to January, it was undertaken without waiting 
for IMF approval and support. An IMF agreement came into effect in June,I6 
although  its  main  provisions  had  already  been  met  ahead  of  schedule. 
Throughout the 1980s,  the TMF and World Bank” continued to provide support 
for Turkey. 
These measures were all initiated under the government of Prime Minister 
Demirel, as already mentioned. However, civil unrest had been a major prob- 
lem prior to the outset of the program, and the Demirel government ruled only 
by coalition. Indeed, it may be said that only the crisis proportions of the eco- 
nomic problem  permitted  Demirel  and Ozal to act  in January. As  they pre- 
sented tax and other measures to Parliament in the summer of  1980, it became 
evident that Parliament was unlikely to approve them. 
In that atmosphere and with violence increasing, the military  intervened in 
September 1980, ousting the Demirel government. Turgut Ozal, however, was 
retained as deputy prime minister in charge of economic policy. Thereafter, a 
number of  additional measures were undertaken.  Perhaps most controversial 
within Turkey, union activity was forbidden, although the same decree prohib- 
ited firms from laying off  workers.’* Other measures  included  relaxation  of 
restrictions governing direct foreign investment, and liberalization of  capital 
markets  as regulations  governing bank  behavior and trade in  securities  and 
other financial instruments were modified. 
16. For particulars, see Okyar (1983). 
17. There were  five World Bank  structural  adjustment loans in  support of Turkish reforms. 
Turkey was the first country to receive such support. For an account of  World Bank lending, see 
Kirkpatrick and Onis (1991). 
18. Not only was this measure controversial politically, but it makes interpretation of the subse- 
quent behavior of employment and real wages difficult. While output was growing fairly rapidly 
in  the years  following  1983, industrial employment and real  wages did not begin  to show  any 
significant  increases until about three years later. Whether this was because union power in the 
late  1970s had driven  industrial  wages and employment to such levels that a retrenchment was 
avoided through these measures, or whether instead of freezing of  employment encouraged em- 
ployers to adopt capital-intensive methods of production while the absence of union activity per- 
mitted wages to languish remains an open issue. Clearly, some of each occurred. At any event, by 
the late 1980s,  employment and wages were growing mwre rapidly, and any analysis of the relation- 
ship of  the macroeconomic failures and sectoral successes of the Turkish reforms does not hinge 
on resolution of that issue. See Krueger and Aktan (1992) for data on employment and real wage 
behavior and a more extended discussion. See also Celasun (1986) for a much more critical inter- 
pretation of the role of labor repression  in the 1980s. 353  Partial Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s in Turkey 
Initially, the foreign trade regime was not overhauled,  although increased 
availability of funds for imports necessarily meant liberalization of the regime. 
In the next  several years, however, quantitative restrictions on imports were 
almost completely abolished, and reliance instead shifted to the exchange rate 
and aggregate demand management as a mechanism for maintaining external 
ba1an~e.I~  Removal of quantitative restrictions was in itself a major change in 
Turkish economic policy and in the structure of incentives confronting Turkish 
producers. Starting in 1984, tariffs were also lowered. By the mid-l980s, Tur- 
key’s protection would have been described as moderate, as contrasted with 
the earlier extremely protective regime. 
The net effect of these measures on some key policy variables can be seen 
in table 1 1.2. The rate of inflation, as measured by the GDP deflator, fell from 
over 100% in 1980 to 42% in 1981 and 28% in 1982. Simultaneously, frequent 
adjustments of the exchange rate led to a depreciation of the real exchange rate 
from a level of 327 at the end of  1979 to 432 at the end of  1980 and 488 at the 
end of  1982, altogether an increase in incentives to exporters of 32%.*O 
As can also be seen in table  11.2, government  expenditures and the fiscal 
deficit fell sharply. SEE financing from the Central Bank virtually ended, while 
the reduction in central government expenditures also reduced the fiscal deficit. 
However, at the same time as that happened, the financial liberalization had 
induced many new entrants into Turkish credit markets. These financiers were 
borrowing and lending in the newly liberalized markets on relatively thin mar- 
gins, and in the summer of  1982, one of the large ones (Banker Kastelli) ap- 
peared in imminent danger of bankruptcy. The military government apparently 
feared a major financial crisis, and reacted by  discharging Turgut  Ozal and 
replacing him with a politician believed to be much more sympathetic to ex- 
pansionary  monetary  and  fiscal  policy.  Shortly  thereafter,  the  military  an- 
nounced that elections would be held in the autumn of 1983. 
There followed a year of relaxation  of fiscal and monetary policy. In the 
1983 elections, Turgut Ozal organized a political party, the Motherland Party, 
which ran against the party supported by  the military. The Motherland Party 
won,  and  Ozal became  prime  minister.  Thereafter,  the  second  stage of  re- 
forms began. 
Before turning to those reforms, however, it is instructive to assess the reac- 
tions of the Turkish economy to the policy changes over the 1980-83  period. 
Table 11.3 gives some data. As can be seen, real GDP declined for 1980 as a 
19. See Baysan and Blitzer (1991) and Krueger and Aktan (1992) for more detailed accounts. 
20. In addition to the exchange rate, a number of other measures were adopted to encourage 
exports. Many, however, had been in place prior to 1980. They certainly contributed to the overall 
incentive to export, but protection remained sufficient so that at best the export incentives offset a 
significant proportion of the bias that still remained toward import substitution through the trade 
regime. That bias began falling significantly after  1984, and the special export incentives were 
reduced, starting at that time. See Krueger and Aktan (1992, chap. 4)  for a detailed discussion. In 
terms of  the change in incentives for exporting, the depreciation of the real exchange rate was 
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Table 11.2  Economic Policy Indicators for the 1980s 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990" 
Nominal 
exchange rate 
(-J-JJUS$)  76  111  163  225  367  522  674  857  1,422  2,121  4,168 
GDP deflator 
(%change)  104  42  28  29  51  41  30  39  66  65  59 
Real exchange 
rateb  432  432  488  509  527  522  505  499  512  473  473 
Nominal interest 
rate  30  36  36  36  55  62  62  66  87  85  65 
Real interestrate  -89  -5  4  1  2  9  18  13  -14  -16  7 
Real government 
expenditures 
(%ofGDP)  25  23  18  23  21  19  21  22  21  23  24 
(%of GDP)  4.0  2.6  1.7  2.6  5.3  2.8  3.6  4.4  3.8  4.4  4.1 
Sources: Krueger and Aktan (1992), rows 1 and 3 from table 9; row 2 from table 12; row 4 from 
table  16; and row  5 from data appendix, table  10. Rows 6 and 7 from Central Bank of Turkey, 
Annual Reports (1987, 1989, 1991). 
"Data for 1990 are not always comparable to those for earlier years. Most are derived from Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, and the percentage changes from 1989 
to 1990 were linked to the data for earlier years. 
The  real exchange rate was calculated as the nominal exchange rate deflated by the Turkish whole- 
sale price index and adjusted for the price level of Turkey's  Group of 7 trading partners. 
Fiscal deficit 
Table 11.3  Turkish Economic Indicators, 1979-83 
~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~ 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Real GDP (billions of  1968 TL)  208  206  215  224  232 
Growth rate  -0.6  -1.1  4.2  4.5  3.3 
Real investment (billions of  1988 TL) 
Private  7.6  6.7  6.2  6.5  6.7 
Public  9.9  9.5  10.3  10.6  10.2 
Index of industrial output (1986 = 100)  N.A.  N.A.  65.1  70.3  76.2 
Imports (billions of US$)  5.1  1.9  8.9  8.8  9.2 
Exports (billions of US$)  2.3  2.9  4.7  5.7  5.7 
Current account deficit  -3.2  -5.6  -4.5  -3.2  -3.7 
Source: Krueger and Aktan (1992). appendix tables. 
whole, although there is little doubt that quarterly data, if they were available, 
would  show the upturn  starting in the  second half of  the year. Growth was 
moderate the following three years. Real private investment continued declin- 
ing in 1981, and did not begin to increase again until 1982; even in 1983 it did 
not reach its 1980 level, much less the levels of the late 1970s. These data were 
reflected in the mood of the times: there was considerable anxiety about the 355  Partial Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s in Turkey 
policy changes, and uncertainty as to whether reforms would persist. While 
removal of  bottlenecks and disruptions associated with  strikes enabled real 
GNP to begin increasing, the increases were moderate. 
The bright spot in the economy during the first three years after the reforms 
was the behavior of  exports. As is evident from table  11.3, exports of  goods 
and services recorded in official statistics were only $2.3 billion in 1979, less 
than half the level of imports. Imports would, of course, have been greater had 
foreign exchange been available.*' 
External financing permitted a 50% increase in imports in 1980, so that the 
current account deficit increased sharply to $5.6 billion in that year, despite an 
increase in recorded exports of  $600 million, or almost 25%. Growth of  ex- 
ports accelerated over the next three years, however, so that export earnings by 
1982 were double their 1980 level, and the current account deficit was back to 
its 1979 level due to the sustained increase in imports. 
By  1983, therefore, it could have been claimed that the 1980 program had 
met its immediate goals: incentives for exports had increased markedly and 
exports had responded; the program had induced financial support from the 
international community, which permitted resumption of an enlarged flow of 
imports necessary to sustain a higher level of real GDP; and the inflation rate 
had fallen from over 100%  to less than 25%. 
11.5  The Second Stage of Reforms 
Once Prime Minister Ozal assumed office in December 1983, an economics 
team was assembled with the assignment to carry reforms further. There was a 
flurry  of  initial measures, including a  major realignment of  interest rates 
(which had been recontrolled in the wake of the Banker Kastelli affair), liberal- 
izations of foreign exchange regulations with removal of virtually all restric- 
tions on tourist travel allowances, permission for commercial banks to retain 
80% initially and then 100% of their foreign currency receipts, and even per- 
mission for capital exports by Turkish residents (with Central Bank approval). 
Import licensing procedures were greatly liberalized, and the highest tariff 
rates were reduced in  1984. In  the next several years, import licensing was 
abandoned, and tariffs were further reduced. 
The initial moves were followed by  a series of major reforms that shifted the 
Turkish economy still further away from its earlier centralized-control mode. A 
value-added tax was introduced in 1985. Reopening of the Istanbul stock ex- 
change (in 1986) and a variety of other measures further liberalized the capital 
market. A foreign exchange market was established, and treasury bonds began 
to be sold by weekly auction. Efforts were begun to privatize some of the SEES. 
21. There is no doubt that smuggling of imports into the country and means of getting exports 
out without surrendering foreign exchange meant that actual imports and exports were greater than 
the officially reported numbers. Nonetheless, there is also no doubt that import shortages were 
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Meanwhile, earlier controls on SEEs’ borrowing had their intended results. 
Whereas SEEs had required financing from the government budget equivalent 
to about  14% of total government expenditures in  the late  1970s and early 
1980s, that percentage fell to 7% in 1984, and then stood in the 2-3%  range 
for several years until it jumped back to 9% in 1991.**  Meanwhile, a second 
factor also contributed to reducing recurring government expenditures. That 
is, expenditures on government personnel dropped, both because government 
employment was frozen as part of  the policy reform package,  and because 
wage adjustments in the public sector lagged significantly behind inflation. 
One might have anticipated that these reduced claims on government expen- 
ditures would have permitted rapid restoration of fiscal balance. Three factors 
contributed to offsetting the reductions. First, the Ozal government increased 
expenditures on infrastructure and public works sharply. To a degree, some of 
these increases reflected deferred maintenance and investment from the 1970s. 
Roads were widened and extended so that traffic delays and damage to vehicles 
were reduced; overseas telephone line capacity was greatly increased and do- 
mestic service enhanced; decades-long neglect of the city of Istanbul was re- 
versed as public works expenditures changed many aspects of that city; and so 
on. A second factor was that with increases in the nominal interest rate the 
costs of servicing the public debt increased, rising from 3% of budgetary ex- 
penditures in 1980 to 2 1  % in 199  1. 
The third factor contributing to increased government expenditures was the 
“political business cycle.” Government expenditures rose markedly prior to 
each electoral cycle. Table  11.4 gives data on the money supply, its compo- 
nents, and its growth rate from 1979 to 1991. As can be seen, monetary expan- 
sion slowed dramatically after 1980, reaching its low point between 1982 and 
1983. Thereafter, Central Bank lending accelerated prior to each election in 
response to the government’s borrowing requirements. Those requirements, in 
turn, were driven in large part by increases in expenditures in the months prior 
to each election. Toward the end of the decade, as the Motherland Party’s per- 
centage of popular votes in the polls fell, these accelerations of expenditures 
increased. As the data in table 11.2 indicate, government expenditures (which 
do not include SEE expenditures) increased from their low of  18% of GNP in 
1982 to 21% in 1986-88  and to 24% by  1990. 
Combined with the increases in overall expenditures, some other practices 
were instituted  that tended  to undermine  some of  the gains that  had been 
achieved. Starting in the mid- 1980s, off-budget “special funds” were estab- 
lished for purposes  such as “workers’ housing,” financed largely by  import 
charges that were largely, although not entirely, across the board.23  In the mid- 
22. The SEEs’ borrowing requirement rose sharply in  1991, equaling 3.2% of GDP despite a 
larger transfer from the central government. This latter rose  from TL1,265 billion in  1990 to 
TL12,200 billion in  1991. After allowing for 65% inflation, that constitutes a real increase of 
480%! 
23. See Krueger and Aktan (1992) for details and estimates of the rates. The rate of tax for the 
special funds reached 10% in 1990. Table 11.4  Money Supply and Credit,  1979-91  (end of year; billions of TL) 
~ 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Money supply (M4) 
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283  459  557  526  861  1,722  2,517  3,651  4,233  5,292  8,369  12,815 
146  266  335  512  530  956  1,782  2,956  4,521  7,404  13,150  18,436 
61  127  440  596  702  985  1,798  2,315  3,432  6,409  10,965  20,748 
19  42  71  130  250  594  1,330  2,693  4,127  5,571  8,658  10,255 
75  148  284  482  560  910  2,049  3,450  4,961  9,634  19,612  30,759 
170  213  21  38  64  127  118  240  397  555  1,749  3,308 
790  1,319  1,806  2,418  3,149  5,568  10,053  16,034  22,771  37,050  65,648  102,240 
76  100  48  25  49  55  43  45  55  68  53  61 
66  85  57  30  58  55  44  44  54  73  52  64 
85  152  29  15  29  27  8  35  125  62  15  51 
71  41  -2  3.5  -29  48  41  88  50  30  24  140 
98  57  -15  77  -51  20  44  135  33  47  11  39 
~ 
Source: Central Bank of  turkey, Quarterly Bulletin, 1992-1, 358  Anne 0.  Krueger 
Table 11.5  Economic Performance after 1984 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Real GNP (trillions of 
Change from preceding 
Investment (trillions of 
Exports of goods and 
1985 TL)  26.4  27.8  30.0  32.3  33.5  34.1 
year (%)  6.0  5.3  7.9  7.7  3.7  1.8 
TL)  4.8  5.8  7.3  8.7  8.4  8.1 
services (billions of 
US$)  7.4  8.3  7.6  10.3  11.9  11.8 
services (billions of 
US$)  10.3  11.2  10.7  13.6  13.7  16.0 
Current account balance 
lmports of goods and 
(billions of US$)  -1.4  -1.0  -1.5  -0.8  1.6  0.9 
37.3  38.0 
9.4  1.9 
10.3  11.1 
13.0  13.7 
22.6  21.0 
-2.6  0.3 
Sources; Krueger and Aktan ( 1992), appendix tables; International Monetary Fund, Internarional 
Financial Statistics Yearbook 1992; OECD, Economic Outlook (June 1992). 
1980s as well, the government  undertook a foreign exchange risk insurance 
scheme (FERIS), under which it lent in domestic currency to investors who 
financed their activities with loans and assumed the foreign exchange risk. In 
the 1970s, a similar scheme, the convertible Turkish lira deposit scheme, had 
resulted in large increases in the money supply when depositors had been in- 
sured against foreign exchange risk in the context of rising inflati~n.?~ 
11.6  Real Growth after 1983 
After about 1984, the results of the sectoral reforms in the Turkish economy 
began to show. They were reflected  in rising  private investment, accelerated 
growth of real GNP, and continued growth of exports of goods and services. 
The data in table 11.5 provide an indication of the degree of success. 
As can be  seen, real GNP growth averaged over 7%  annually in the five 
years starting in 1984. The OECD (1991,91) estimates that total factor produc- 
tivity, which had grown at an average annual rate of  1.1% in  1979-85  with 
output growth of  3.8% and negative growth of capital productivity, grew at an 
average annual rate of 4.5% in  1987-89,  with an 8% rate of growth of output 
in nongovernment economic activities. 
Rapid export growth also continued: exports had constituted only around 
5% of GNP in the late 1970s and were 20% of GNP by  1987. This attests to 
24. See Celasun and Rodrik (1989) for an account. The 1980 scheme was not as explosive as 
the 1970 scheme because interest rates were significantly higher relative to the inflation rate, and 
all interest rates were adjusted every six months. In the 1970s, fixed nominal interest rates, well 
below the rate of inflation, had persisted for the life of the loan. 359  Partial Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s in Turkey 
the enormous structural changes that were taking place in the Turkish economy 
in response to the sectoral reforms. 
Although imports of goods and services were also growing, the Turkish cur- 
rent account balance, which had been around $5 billion  in  1980 and in the 
range of  $3-4  billion in  1981-85  (see table 11.3), fell to less than $1 billion 
by 1987 and even turned positive in 1988 and 1989, and again in 1991. 
11.7  Failure with Macro Reforms 
Thus, in real terms, there was every reason to believe that the Turkish policy 
changes of the  1980s had been successful. Whereas in  1980 it was believed 
that further growth possibilities through import substitution had probably been 
exhausted, by the late 1980s, it was evident that Turkey’s potential for growth 
through integrating with the yorld economy was substantial. Moreover, the 
earlier suspicion of private business that had accompanied etatism had been 
replaced  by  recognition  that Turkish industry could perform when provided 
with appropriate incentives and adequate infrastructure. 
Despite these successes, however, the macro reforms were in difficulty. As 
already indicated, the  major problem  was that government  expenditures  in- 
creased beyond the ability of the government to increase tax collections. Gov- 
ernment expenditures were growing more rapidly than GNP, despite its rapid 
growth. This is reflected in the rising share of government expenditures in GNP 
shown in table  11.6. This increase in expenditures took place despite the re- 
pression of civil servant salaries and the virtual elimination of SEE deficits as 
a budgetary drain (at least until the 1990s). The major increases in expendi- 
tures were on infrastructure and interest on the debt, on a fairly sustained basis, 
and on transfer payments prior to each round of  elections. This is reflected in 
table  11.6, which gives data on government expenditures and their composi- 
tion, As can be  seen, interest payments constituted only 4%  of  government 
expenditures in 1981 and had risen to more than 20% by the late 1980s. Invest- 
ment expenditures rose absolutely and as a share of total expenditures until 
1987, and fell thereafter, while transfers fluctuated with the proximity to elec- 
tions. Simultaneously, tax revenues were growing more slowly than income.25 
There is no mystery  as to why inflation persisted. Throughout the  1980s, 
monetary expansion continued and by all estimates was the crucial determining 
factor in the inflation rate. To be sure, financial liberalization, and in particular 
the moves toward full convertibility of the Turkish lira, led to some currency 
substitution: whereas the ratio of M2 to GNP fell from .224 to .203 over the 
25. The imposition of the value-added tax in  1985 was judged a great success and yielded more 
revenue initially than had  been anticipated. However, in order to improve incentives, the Ozal 
government had reduced very high marginal tax rates and corporate tax rates. The net result was 
that tax revenues did not rise even proportionately with income. Gokcekus and Kipici (1992) ran 
a logarithmic regression of tax revenues on GNP for the period from 1980 to 199  I. Their estimated 
elasticity of tax revenues with respect to real GNP growth for the entire period is 34. Table 11.6  Consolidated Budget, 1979-91  (billions of TL) 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991" 
Expenditures  613  1,110  1,503  1,575  2,613  3,785  5,263  8,160  13,043  21,447  38,871  68,527  129,345 
Current  262  497  645  720  1,069  1,488  2,086  3,051  4,538  7,460  16,660  33,452  60,900 
Investment  95  170  310  344  503  677  989  1,619  2,642  3,564  5,818  10,055  16,600 
Transfers  256  443  481  434  831  1,179  1,514  2,159  3,598  5,445  8,134  11,054  27,723 
SEEs  83  153  214  233  292  275  181  138  446  1,025  1,223  1,257  11,200 
Interest  N.A.  N.A.  67  87  210  441  674  1,330  2,266  4,978  8,259  13,966  24,122 
Revenues  526  933  1,330  1,424  2,314  2,806  4,476  6,754  10,445  17,587  31,369  56,753  97,000 
Taxes  406  750  1,191  1,305  1,934  2,372  3,829  5,972  9,051  14,232  25.550  45,399  78,650 
Nontaxes  120  183  139  119  380  434  647  782  1,394  3,355  5,819  11,354  18,350 
Deficits  87  177  173  151  299  979  787  1,406  2,598  3,860  7,502  11,774  32,345 
Net domestic 
borrowing  31  17  50  28  167  137  498  476  896  2,433  5,982  7,942  1,812 
GNP  2,200  4,435  6,555  8,722  11,552  18,375  27,789  39,310  58,565  100,582  170,412  287,254  454,838 
8  of total expenditures 
Current  43  45  43  46  41  39  40  37  35  35  43  49  47 
Investment  15  15  21  22  19  18  19  20  20  17  15  15  13 
Transfers  42  40  32  28  32  31  29  26  28  25  21  16  21 
SEEs  14  14  14  15  11  7  3  2  3  5  3  2  9 
Interest  N.A.  N.A.  4  6  8  12  13  16  17  23  21  20  19 
Taxes  77  80  90  92  84  85  86  88  87  81  81  80  81 
Nontaxes  23  20  10  8  16  15  14  12  13  19  19  20  19 
Government 
expendituresGNP  28  25  23  18  23  21  19  21  22  21  23  24  28 
Deficithevenue  17  19  13  11  13  35  18  21  25  22  24  21  33 
DeficidGNP  4.0  4.0  2.6  1.7  2.6  5.3  2.8  3.6  4.4  3.8  4.4  4.1  7.  I 
Sources: for 1979-80, State Planning Organization, The Deweloprnenrs before the 5th Development Plan; for 1981-82, Central Bank of Turkey Annual Report, 1985; 
for 1983, Central Bank of Turkey Annual Report, 1987; for 1984-86,  Central Bank of Turkey Annual Report, 1989; for 1987-91,  Central Bank of  Turkey Annual 
Report, 1991. The numbers in Central Bank of Turkey annual reports are based on Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade provisional numbers. 
aProvisional numbers. 
% of total revenues 
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1984-90  period, the ratio of  M2 plus foreign exchange holdings of  Turkish 
nationals rose from .231 to .253 (having been as high as .275 in  1986) over 
that period.2h The Central Bank tried to use a variety of  instruments to curb 
inflation, but was essentially powerless to do so in the face of the financing 
needs of the government b~dget.~’  In 1991, the OECD provided reduced form 
econometric estimates of the inflation rate and the difference between the gov- 
ernment deficit and the effect of  output growth on base-money demand. Ac- 
cording to those estimates, over 70% of the variability in underlying inflation 
in Turkey could be explained by the monetization of public sector deficits.28 
Until the late 1980s, the association of prospective elections with successive 
bouts of inflation (which are much more evident in quarterly data than in an- 
nual) was evident to all, and there was some credibility to the notion that gov- 
ernment  expenditures  would  be  contained  “after  the  election.”  By  the  late 
1980s, however, it was apparent to all that the support for Prime Minister Ozal 
and the Motherland Party  was weakening, and that there was little prospect 
that government  budgetary discipline could be relied upon to bring  about a 
significant reduction in the rate of inflation. 
When in 1991 new elections returned Suleyman Demirel to the prime minis- 
ter’s office leading a coalition government, the earlier problems intensified. As 
can be seen from table 11.6, the fiscal deficit increased sharply, as, among other 
things, the SEE drain on the government budget increased sharply. 
11.8  Reasons for Successful Sectoral and Failed Macro Reforms 
There is little mystery  remaining in why there was Turkish inflation. The 
interesting questions center on how the sectoral reforms could have succeeded, 
at least initially, while the macro reforms were unable to stabilize the economy, 
and  how  macroeconomic  instability  has  affected  and  will  affect  the  sus- 
tainability of the sectoral reforms. The first question is tackled here. The sec- 
ond question must await analysis of the first. 
Three major factors probably account for the success and durability of the 
sectoral reforms during the 1980s.  First, there was the evident failure of earlier 
economic policies. Second, there was the personality, determination, and con- 
26. From the background paper by  Gokcekus and Kipici (1992), based on data presented in 
Atiyas and Ersel (1992). 
27. In 1983-84,  there was an effort to curb inflationary expectations by  setting the short-term 
interest rate above the long-term interest rate. When the inflation rate did not decline, however, 
people shifted to holding short-term accounts, and the policy was abandoned. The Central Bank 
began auctioning treasury bills in 1985, which drove up the cost of borrowing. Politically, however, 
there seems to have been no way to curb government expenditures. 
In order to investigate whether inflation caused money creation or conversely, Gokcekus and 
Kipici (1992, 3) used quarterly data for first quarter 1983 through fourth quarter 1991. They used 
the Schwartz criterion and used a two-quarter lag structure. They found very  strong causality 
between the quarterly inflation rate and changes in reserve money, in both directions, but with 
stronger causation from money to inflation and the price level than conversely. 
28. See also Rodrik (1990). who provides a rationale for such an estimation procedure. 362  Anne 0.  Krueger 
trol of Prime Minister Ozal. Third, there was the initial success of the sectoral 
reforms in bringing about evident changes. 
Before addressing these three factors individually, however, one other fea- 
ture of the Turkish experience must be noted. That is, at least until  1988, the 
rate of inflation had come down, and the argument put forward by Prime Min- 
ister Ozal and the Motherland Party-that  inflation would be reduced after the 
election-had  some credibility. Equally, in the early  1980s, stabilization had 
initially succeeded, and provided scope for the sectoral reforms within a mac- 
roeconomic framework that appeared to offer promise of stability. The gains 
for the economy that resulted from both the early sectoral reforms and from 
stabilization  provided  a  momentum  that  permitted  accelerating  economic 
growth at least through the 1986-88  period. 
The first factor that permitted the reforms, especially the sectoral reforms, 
to continue was the evident failure of earlier policies. The fact that the econ- 
omy had been in crisis, and that the government of Biilent Ecevit had tried the 
old remedies with little success, had convinced many Turks that there was no 
alternative to change. In effect, opposition to change had been defeated by the 
failure of the earlier policies. 
The second factor, the personality and commitment of Prime Minister Ozal, 
cannot be doubted. Not only did he believe in changing the role of the govern- 
ment  in the economy, he believed  it was the achievement for which history 
would remember him. In that sense, it was at the top of his agenda, and re- 
ceived his personal attention. After the military takeover in September 1980, 
he had the support of the military for the continuation of the reform program. 
That gave him, and the technocrats who worked with him, considerable lati- 
tude in the short run. Although he lost that authority in  1983, he regained it 
with the election late in that year, and was again able to appoint and support 
technocrats who shared his vision of a changed Turkish economy. 
During the 1980-83  period, it may be noted, Turkish economic growth was 
modest,  albeit  considerably  more  satisfactory  than  it  had  been  in  the  late 
1970~~~  Considerable opposition to the reforms emerged in 1984-85,  as mili- 
tary rule had ended and opposition became more vocal. However, by that time, 
economic growth was accelerating, and that helped to mute it. It is arguable 
that if growth had not accelerated when it did, the opposition would have been 
able to reverse some of the sectoral reforms, especially in the import regime. 
If those factors account for the sustainability of the sectoral reforms, at least 
through the late  1980s, why were the macro reforms less successful? Proxi- 
mately, of course, the reason is that the government  was unable to increase 
revenues or reduce expenditures in ways that would permit the Central Bank 
29. Most countries during 1980-83  were in deep recession, and it may be argued that Turkish 
economic growth was sluggish for that reason. The fact that Turkey was doing so much better than 
other countries, however, was little noted in the domestic policy debate. 363  Partial Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s in Turkey 
to brake the growth of the money supply more than it in fact did. The question, 
then, is why the government fiscal posture remained so expansionary. 
That answer, too, has several parts. First, there is the personality of  Ozal. 
Second, there were some genuine infrastructural problems that needed to be 
addressed if  the private sector was to be able to expand in accordance with 
Ozal’s blueprint. Third, and most important, however, were the political con- 
straints imposed on the Motherland Party in its attempt to maintain power. 
There seems to be little doubt that, committed as Ozal was to shifting toward 
more reliance on the private sector for economic growth, he was also an engi- 
neer and, perhaps because of that, a builder. He believed that better telephones, 
roads, port facilities, and other infrastructure would pay for themselves in ac- 
celerated growth. In that sense, he attached less weight to the goal of combat- 
ting inflation than he did to the goal of resuming and accelerating growth with 
more efficient allocation of resources and reliance on the private sector. Belief 
in the role of incentives led him to support reductions in the earlier very high 
marginal rates of corporate and income taxation. Despite the success of  the 
value-added tax, tax revenues simply did not rise as rapidly as real income, 
which contributed to the difficulties. Ozal also almost certainly underestimated 
the risk of inflation, and the ease with which monetary expansion before vari- 
ous elections could be reversed afterward. 
The need for improved infrastructure  clearly fed into Ozal’s perceptions. 
There is little doubt that Turkish exports could not have expanded as much as 
they did if telephone connections had not been improved, if port and domestic 
carrying capacity had not been expanded, and if power facilities had not been 
greatly increased. 
But the third factor, the political  imperatives of  remaining in office, was 
clearly compelling. In fact, if one observes the explosion in government expen- 
ditures attendant upon the shift in power in 1991, one might conclude that Ozal 
had been remarkably successful in containing demands from various political 
constituencies for greater expenditures. The fact is that Ozal’s support was 
weakening, and in an effort to retain power, he apparently perceived little op- 
tion but to increase expenditures in the hope of gaining support. In the end, he 
was unsuccessful, but the coalition government that followed found the imper- 
ative to increase government expenditures even more compelling, and infla- 
tionary pressures intensified. 
11.9  Can Sectoral Reforms Succeed while Macro Reforms Fail? 
The more difficult question is the impact that failed macro reforms will ulti- 
mately have on Turkish economic growth and the sustainability of the sectoral 
reforms. To date, the evidence is mixed. By the late 1980s, when the inflation 
rate was remaining  stubbornly  in the 60-70%  range,  there was an interval 
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Table 11.7  Inflation Rates and the Real Exchange Rate, late 1986-92 
1986  I 987  1988  1989  I990  1991 
Rate of  inflation (%r)"  30  32  68  70  53  55 
Nominal exchange rate  674  857  I422  2121  2608  5079 
Real exchange rate 
(1985 =  99  95  94  82  59  74 
"Rate  of inflation is percentage change in the wholesale price index, from SIS, Srafisfica[ Yearbook 
of  Turkey for 1988 and earlier; from Central Bank of Turkey, Annual Reporr (1991)  for later years. 
bReal exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate deflated by the Turkish wholesale price index. 
An increase in the index indicates a depreciation in the real exchange rate. 
of inflation. The result was a major real appreciation of the Turkish lira. Table 
11.7 gives the relevant data. 
As can be seen, the nominal exchange rate increased by less than the Turkish 
rate  of  inflation  in each year after  1985. At first, the real  appreciation  was 
modest, and arguably  was within the range that may well  have been appro- 
priate, given rates of inflation in Turkey's major trading partners (at most 4% 
annually), and the decline in the price of oil in  1986. By  1989, however, the 
real  appreciation  was much  larger, and in  1990, the nominal  exchange rate 
changed by less than two-thirds the rate of inflation. 
By late 1989, the real appreciation of the Turkish lira was already having a 
visible effect on export earnings and the demand for imports (see table 11.5). 
By 199  I, however, the Turkish lira was depreciating in nominal terms by more 
than the rate of inflation. Clearly, had the real appreciation of the Turkish lira 
continued, it would not have been possible to maintain the open trade regime: 
import licensing would have had to be reimposed, which in itself would have 
represented  a major setback for the credibility of  the entire set of  sector re- 
f~ms.~O 
Since 1988, however, the rate of  economic growth has fluctuated sharply 
(see table 11 3.  Much of the fluctuation may be attributed to alternative tight- 
ening and easing of monetary policy and credit in response to the fluctuations 
in aggregate  demand resulting from expansionary  fiscal policies,  especially 
prior to elections. 
Those fluctuations in themselves would appear to constitute something of a 
damper on the potential for economic growth. Real rates of  interest have been 
as high as 50% in periods when the authorities were attempting to reduce ag- 
gregate demand. Those rates in themselves, as well as uncertainty as to their 
future levels, must also be somewhat growth retarding. 
Even more problematic, however, is the fact that there is little prospect for 
30. There was some concern in  the late  1980s that real private  investment  in  manufacturing, 
necessary  to support a continued increase in exports, might not be increasing. Data for the early 
1990s, however, indicate that this phenomenon was reversed  in 1990. See OECD (1992). 365  Partial Adjustment and Growth in the  1980s in Turkey 
significantly reduced fiscal expansion in the near future. The present govern- 
ment,  a coalition, does not  appear to have the political  ability to  withstand 
expansionary measures. The public borrowing requirement, equal to 12.5% of 
GNP in 1991, was forecast at 8.8% of GNP for 1992, but by August it seemed 
evident that that target would not likely be achieved (Financial Times, August 
3, 1992, 3). 
However, if the authorities maintain an open trade and payments regime, it 
would appear that prospects are for inflation itself to become the “crisis” prob- 
lem that must somehow be resolved. Given past political sensitivities to infla- 
tion,  it  is perhaps surprising that there has not  already  been  more  political 
protest against it. Yet given a weak coalition government, accelerating inflation 
and macroeconomic difficulties seem very likely. 
The important question is probably not whether there will need to be a pe- 
riod of tight fiscal and monetary policy. The question is how inflation rates of 
at least 60-70%,  if  not more, culminating in a period of austerity, will affect 
the sectoral reforms which so far have succeeded in the Turkish economy. 
It is not possible to provide a definitive answer. On one hand, it is possible 
that the present coalition government, in response to increasing political dis- 
content over inflation, may respond with reimposition of controls over various 
sectors of  the economy, including price controls, credit rationing,  import li- 
censing, fixation of the nominal exchange rate to attempt to contain inflation, 
and other measures. If this should happen, it would of course imply that failure 
to have achieved macroeconomic stability would have undermined the sectoral 
economic reforms. Turkey would then presumably undergo a period of stabili- 
zation followed by another period of sectoral reform at some time in the future, 
with poor growth prospect in the interim. 
On the other hand, there are some grounds for being somewhat more opti- 
mistic. First, the performance of  private  producers,  both  in  bringing  better- 
quality items to the Turkish market and in competing abroad, has greatly re- 
duced the suspicion with which private economic activity was viewed by the 
majority of Turks. Because of the greater confidence of the public in the busi- 
ness community, its political positions and influence on the political process 
are more important than they were prior to 1980. 
Second, the earlier import substitution policies seem to have been greatly 
discredited in the crisis of  the late  1970s. While it is imaginable that import 
restrictions might be reimposed in reaction to accelerating triple-digit inflation, 
it is not imaginable that Turks would believe that these controls were support- 
ing economic growth as they earlier did. As such, the basis for removing them 
would be greater. 
Third, and perhaps most important,  however, is that Turks, especially  the 
middle- and upper-income groups whose desire for modernization and whose 
views on economic development strategy were so important in support of etat- 
ism and government intervention, have benefited enormously from the reforms. 
Restrictions  on  currency  have  been  largely  removed,  and Turks  can  travel 366  Anne 0.  Krueger 
freely. Imported goods are available in the shops, including items such as phar- 
maceuticals and books that earlier had been more readily obtainable in the 
black market. And the quality of goods produced domestically has improved, 
in many cases dramatically. The likelihood that the intellectuals who exercise 
leadership roles in shaping public opinion could be persuaded of the virtues of 
the ancien rCgime seems fairly remote. 
The questions then are probably two. The first is whether the Turkish econ- 
omy can continue to function moderately satisfactorily in the context of  rapid 
inflation. If it can, the next question, and probably the most important one, is 
whether a macroeconomic stabilization program can be adopted and imple- 
mented at some future date in ways that do not seriously distort private sector 
incentives. If so, the sectoral reforms of the 1980s will have been an important 
stepping stone toward further growth of  the Turkish economy. Even if  not, 
Turkish economic performance and productivity improved significantly in the 
1980s. While there would be considerable waste in having to repeat the sec- 
toral reform process, there has been a great deal of learning, and future Turkish 
efforts would start from a considerably higher base because of the experience 
of the 1980s. 
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